MANUFACTURING
Modern manufacturing doesn’t just run on steel and electricity anymore — it runs on code. The logic inside PLCs, the firmware inside controllers, and the software that orchestrates pneumatic / compressed-air automation (compressors, valves, actuators, air prep units).
These attacks are real:
Stuxnet proved PLC sabotage is real: it specifically targeted Siemens STEP7 environments and manipulated PLC behavior while masking what operators saw.
TRITON/TRISIS showed attackers can go after the last line of defense — industrial safety instrumented systems — with potential real-world consequences.
Industroyer2 demonstrated purpose-built ICS malware is still evolving, targeting operational protocols, VPNs and environments — not just “office IT.”
And even “classic” ransomware has shut manufacturers down and forced manual operations—Norsk Hydro’s 2019 incident is a well-documented example.
Bottom line: if an attacker can change logic, firmware, or the engineering toolchain, they can change pressure, flow, timing, and motion — including in air automation where subtle changes can mean scrap, downtime, or unsafe states.
How our AI Cyber Reasoning Engine secures PLCs, air automation, and OT firmware
Specialized scanners: Pentium-class x86 + Siemens firmware intelligence
Pentium / x86 instruction-set–aware scanning: we analyze legacy gateways, engineering utilities, and embedded binaries by disassembling/decompiling x86 (Pentium-class) code, building control-flow + data-flow graphs, and flagging memory safety issues, unsafe calls, auth/crypto mistakes, and backdoor-like patterns.
Siemens firmware scanning: we parse Siemens-related firmware/artifacts and the surrounding toolchain to catch issues that are common in real incidents—like DLL/toolchain weaknesses and “trust the engineering station” assumptions (an example class of STEP7 issues has been formally tracked in ICS advisories). CISA+1
AI-assisted triage that understands exploit paths in factories
Instead of dumping thousands of findings, the AI correlates:
- reachable paths from engineering stations → PLC logic → fieldbus/IO behavior
- asset criticality (e.g., “this PLC controls compressor staging / safety interlocks”) known weakness patterns + novel variants (code similarity, semantic reasoning)
Autonomous remediation + verification (with a paper trail)
For each high-confidence issue, the platform can:
- propose safe code changes (bounds checks, safer APIs, auth hardening, cryptographic fixes)
- generate pull requests / patch sets and link them to CWE/IEC-62443 style controls
- re-scan and verify that the vulnerability is actually eliminated (not just “patched on paper”)